260SmithWatt 70Neumann 50F.Abed , AI20s.com Fei-Fei Li, Zbee

HumansAI.com NormanMacrae.net AIGames.solar EconomistDiary.com Abedmooc.com

xI have only been to Ukraine once - it was about 15 years ago in Kiev-lovely young people looking so forward to building a future for everyone; 

When I look back at that I feel sad as a  European , a world citizen- of course being one of the majority of scots who lost our nation in a banking scam in early 1700s and sailed the seven seas as a Diaspora nation , I realise I am not the most competent at questioning what good and bad does the ideology of nation do to peoples across generations of youth?
BUT
-what  I mean to ask:  if you sat high up in brussels as a peace policy maker ...or  economist - wasn't it clear that Ukraine as a border nation between West and East needed some massive kind of cooperative investment- how about a massive superport through which all neighbouring countries could trade freely- but where the investment was put in permanent trust of the future youth born withing the territory of ukraine - or start up a khan academy type free coursera university and make sure one of the early specialties was cross-cultural joy of youth or -look forward to your dream of what could the whole planet invest in when they have 15 years to sustain a border territory

There is a series of 3 youth and nobel peace summits begun in warsaw 2013, cape town 2014,, atlanta 2015 - if you think it would be possible to form a correspondnce club on sorts of topics above so that ideas can be input in cape town or atlanta please mail me chris.macrae@yahoo.co.uk subject youth union

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The Future of Europe: An Interview with George Soros
George Soros and Gregor Peter Schmitz APRIL 24, 2014 ISSUE
Parts of the following interview with George Soros by the Spiegel correspondent Gregor Peter Schmitz appear in their book, The Tragedy of the European Union: Disintegration or Revival?, just published by PublicAffairs.

This interview will appear in the April 24, 2014 issue of The New York Review.

soros_1-042414
Maxim Shemetov/Reuters
Supporters of the Russian annexation of Crimea at a rally in Red Square, Moscow, March 18, 2014
Gregor Peter Schmitz: The conflict in Crimea and Ukraine has changed the shape of European and world politics, and we will come to it. But let us first talk about a subject on which you’ve taken a critical position over the years: the crisis of the European Union: With regard to the euro, isn’t the worst over?

George Soros: If you mean that the euro is here to stay, you are right. That was confirmed by the German elections, where the subject was hardly discussed, and by the coalition negotiations, where it was relegated to Subcommittee 2A. Chancellor Angela Merkel is satisfied with the way she handled the crisis and so is the German public. They reelected her with an increased majority. She has always done the absolute minimum necessary to preserve the euro. This has earned her the allegiance of both the pro-Europeans and those who count on her to protect German national interests. That is no mean feat.

So the euro is here to stay, and the arrangements that evolved in response to the crisis have become established as the new order governing the eurozone. This confirms my worst fears. It’s the nightmare I’ve been talking about. I’m hopeful that the Russian invasion of Crimea may serve as a wake-up call. Germany is the only country in a position to change the prevailing order. No debtor country can challenge it; any that might try would be immediately punished by the financial markets and the European authorities.

Schmitz: If you said that to Germans, they would say: Well, we have already evolved a lot. We are more generous now and have modified our policy of austerity.

Soros: I acknowledge that Germany has stopped pushing the debtor countries underwater. They are getting a little bit of oxygen now and are beginning to breathe. Some, particularly Italy, are still declining, but at a greatly diminished pace. This has given a lift to the financial markets because the economies are hitting bottom and that almost automatically brings about a rebound.

But the prospect of a long period of stagnation has not been removed. It’s generally agreed that the eurozone is threatened by deflation but opposition from the German Constitutional Court and its own legal departments will prevent the European Central Bank (ECB) from successfully overcoming the deflationary pressures the way other central banks, notably the Federal Reserve, have done.

The prospect of stagnation has set in motion a negative political dynamic. Anybody who finds the prevailing arrangements intolerable is pushed into an anti-European posture. This leads me to expect the process of disintegration to gather momentum. During the acute phase of the euro crisis we had one financial crisis after another. Now there should be a series of political rather than financial crises, although the latter cannot be excluded.

Schmitz: You say that current arrangements are intolerable. What exactly needs to change? What needs to be reformed?

Soros: At the height of the euro crisis, Germany agreed to a number of systemic reforms, the most important of which was a banking union. But as the financial pressures abated, Germany whittled down the concessions it had made. That led to the current arrangements, which confirm my worst fears.

Schmitz: As we speak, European finance ministers are in the process of concluding an agreement on the banking union. What do you think of it?

Soros: In the process of negotiations, the so-called banking union has been transformed into something that is almost the exact opposite: the re-establishment of national “silos,” or separately run banks. This is a victory for Orwellian newspeak.

Schmitz: What’s wrong with it?

Soros: The incestuous relationship between national authorities and bank managements. France in particular is famous for its inspecteurs de finance, who end up running its major banks. Germany has its Landesbanken and Spain its caixas, which have unhealthy connections with provincial politicians. These relationships were a major source of weakness in the European banking system and played an important part in the banking crisis that is still weighing on the eurozone. The proposed banking union should have eliminated them, but they were largely preserved, mainly at German insistence.

Schmitz: That is a pretty drastic condemnation. How do you justify it?

Soros: In effect, the banking union will leave the banking system without a lender of last resort. The proposed resolution authority is so complicated, with so many decision-making entities involved, that it is practically useless in an emergency. Even worse, the ECB is legally prohibited from undertaking actions for which it is not expressly authorized. That sets it apart from other central banks, which are expected to use their discretion in an emergency.

But Germany was determined to limit the liabilities that it could incur through the ECB. As a result, member countries remain vulnerable to financial pressures from which other developed countries are exempt. That is what I meant when I said that over-indebted members of the EU are in the position of third-world countries that are overindebted in a foreign currency. The banking union does not correct that defect. On the contrary, it perpetuates it.

Schmitz: You sound disappointed.

Soros: I am. I left no stone unturned trying to prevent this outcome, but now that it has happened, I don’t want to keep knocking my head against the wall. I accept that Germany has succeeded in imposing a new order on Europe, although I consider it unacceptable. But I still believe in the European Union and the principles of the open society that originally inspired it, and I should like to recapture that spirit. I want to arrest the process of disintegration, not accelerate it. So I am no longer advocating that Germany should “lead or leave the euro.” The window of opportunity to bring about radical change in the rules governing the euro has closed.

Schmitz: So, basically, you are giving up on Europe?

Soros: No. I am giving up on changing the financial arrangements, the creditor–debtor relationship that has now turned into a permanent system. I will continue to focus on politics, because that is where I expect dramatic developments.

Schmitz: I see. Obviously, people are concerned about the rise of populist movements in Europe. Do you see any opportunity to push for more political integration, when the trend is toward disintegration?

Soros: I do believe in finding European solutions for the problems of Europe; national solutions make matters worse.

Schmitz: It seems the pro-Europeans are often silent on important issues because they are afraid that speaking up might increase support for the extremists—for example, in the case of the many refugees from the Middle East and Africa who hoped to reach Europe and were detained on the Italian island of Lampedusa.

Soros: Like it or not, migration policy will be a central issue in the elections. We must find some alternative to xenophobia.

Schmitz: What do you propose to do about it?

Soros: I have established an Open Society Initiative for Europe—OSIFE for short. One of its first initiatives is Solidarity Now, in Greece. The original idea was to generate European solidarity with the plight of the Greek population that is suffering from the euro crisis and Greek solidarity with the plight of the migrants, who experience inhuman conditions and are persecuted by the ultranationalist Golden Dawn party. It took us some time to get the project off the ground, and by the time we did, it was too late to generate European solidarity with the Greeks because other heavily indebted countries were also in need of support. So we missed that boat, but our initiative has had the useful by product of giving us a better insight into the migration problem.

Schmitz: What have you learned?

Soros: That there is an unbridgeable conflict between North and South on the political asylum issue. The countries in the North, basically the creditors, have been generous in their treatment of asylum seekers. So all the asylum seekers want to go there, particularly to Germany. But that is more than they can absorb, so they have put in place a European agreement called Dublin III, which requires asylum seekers to register in the country where they first enter the EU. That tends to be the South, namely, Italy, Spain, and Greece. All three are heavily indebted and subject to fiscal austerity. They don’t have proper facilities for asylum seekers, and they have developed xenophobic, anti-immigrant, populist political movements.

Asylum seekers are caught in a trap. If they register in the country where they arrive, they can never ask for asylum in Germany. So, many prefer to remain illegal, hoping to make their way to Germany. They are condemned to illegality for an indefinite period. The miserable conditions in which they live feed into the anti-immigrant sentiment.

Schmitz: Looking at other European issues, aren’t your foundations also very involved in the problems of the Roma (Gypsies)?

Soros: Yes, we have been engaged in those issues for more than twenty-five years. The Roma Education Fund has developed effective methods of educating Roma children and strengthening their Roma identity at the same time. If this were done on a large-enough scale it would destroy the hostile stereotype that stands in the way of the successful integration of the Roma. As it is, educated Roma can blend into the majority because they don’t fit the stereotype but the stereotype remains intact.

This is another instance where the European Commission is having a positive effect. I look to the European Structural funds to scale up the programs that work.

Schmitz: What do you think of Vladimir Putin’s recent policies with respect to Ukraine, Crimea, and Europe?

Soros: Now you are coming to the crux of the matter. Russia is emerging as a big geopolitical player, and the European Union needs to realize that it has a resurgent rival on its east. Russia badly needs Europe as a partner, but Putin is positioning it as a rival. There are significant political forces within the Russian regime that are critical of Putin’s policy on that score.

Schmitz: Can you be more specific?

Soros: The important thing to remember is that Putin is leading from a position of weakness. He was quite popular in Russia because he restored some order out of the chaos. The new order is not all that different from the old one, but the fact that it is open to the outside world is a definite improvement, an important element in its stability. But then the prearranged switch with Dmitry Medvedev from prime minister to president deeply upset the people. Putin felt existentially threatened by the protest movement. He became repressive at home and aggressive abroad.

That is when Russia started shipping armaments to the Assad regime in Syria on a massive scale and helped turn the tide against the rebels. The gamble paid off because of the preoccupation of the Western powers—the United States and the EU—with their internal problems. Barack Obama wanted to retaliate against Syria’s use of chemical weapons. He asked for congressional approval and was about to be rebuffed when Putin came to the rescue and persuaded Assad to voluntarily surrender his chemical weapons.

That was a resounding diplomatic victory for him. Yet the spontaneous uprising of the Ukrainian people must have taught Putin that his dream of reconstituting what is left of the Russian Empire is unattainable. He is now facing a choice between persevering or changing course and becoming more cooperative abroad and less repressive at home. His current course has already proved to be self-defeating, but he appears to be persevering.

Schmitz: Is Russia a credible threat to Europe if its economy is as weak as you say?

Soros: The oligarchs who control much of the Russian economy don’t have any confidence in the regime. They send their children and money abroad. That is what makes the economy so weak. Even with oil over $100 a barrel, which is the minimum Russia needs to balance its budget, it is not growing. Putin turned aggressive out of weakness. He is acting in self-defense. He has no scruples, he can be ruthless, but he is a judo expert, not a sadist—so the economic weakness and the aggressive behavior are entirely self-consistent.

Schmitz: How should Europe respond to it?

Soros: It needs to be more united, especially in response to Russian aggression in Ukraine. Putin prides himself on being a geopolitical realist. He respects strength and is emboldened by weakness. Yet there is no need to be permanently adversarial. Notwithstanding the current situation in Ukraine, the European Union and Russia are in many ways complementary; they both need each other. There is plenty of room for Russia to play a constructive role in the world, exactly because both Europe and the United States are so preoccupied with their internal problems.

Schmitz: How does that translate into practice, particularly in the Middle East?

Soros: It has totally transformed the geopolitical situation. I have some specific ideas on this subject, but it is very complicated. I can’t possibly explain it in full because there are too many countries involved and they are all interconnected.

Schmitz: Give it a try.

Soros: I should start with a general observation. There are a growing number of unresolved political crises in the world. That is a symptom of a breakdown in global governance. We have a very rudimentary system in place. Basically, there is only one international institution of hard power: the UN Security Council. If the five permanent members agree, they can impose their will on any part of the world. But there are many sovereign states with armies; and there are failed states that are unable to protect their monopoly over the use of lethal force or hard power.

The cold war was a stable system. The two superpowers were stalemated by the threat of mutually assured destruction, and they had to restrain their satellites. So wars were fought mainly at the edges. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a brief moment when the United States emerged as the undisputed leader of the world. But it abused its power. Under the influence of the neocons, who argued that the United States should use its power to impose its will on the world, President George W. Bush declared “war on terror” and invaded Iraq under false pretenses.

That was a tragic misinterpretation of the proper role of hegemonic or imperial power. It is the power of attraction—soft power—that ensures the stability of empires. Hard power may be needed for conquest and self-protection, but the hegemon must look after the interests of those who depend on it in order to secure their allegiance instead of promoting only its own interests. The United States did that very well after World War II, when it established the United Nations and embarked on the Marshall Plan. But President Bush forgot that lesson and destroyed American supremacy in no time. The neocons’ dream of a “new American century” lasted less than ten years. President Obama then brought American policy back to reality. His record in foreign policy is better than generally recognized. He accepted the tremendous loss of power and influence and tried to “lead from behind.” In any case, he is more preoccupied with domestic than foreign policy. In that respect America is in the same position as Europe, although for different reasons. People are inward-looking and tired of war. This has created a power vacuum, which has allowed conflicts to fester unresolved all over the world.

Recently, Russia has moved into this power vacuum, trying to reassert itself as a geopolitical player. That was a bold maneuver, inspired by Putin’s internal weakness, and it has paid off in Syria because of the weakness of the West. Russia could do what the Western powers couldn’t: persuade Assad to “voluntarily” surrender his chemical weapons. That has radically changed the geopolitical landscape. Suddenly, the prospect of a solution has emerged for the three major unresolved conflicts in the Middle East—Palestine, Iran, and Syria—when one would have least expected it.

The Syrian crisis is by far the worst, especially in humanitarian consequences. Russia’s entry as a major supplier of arms, coupled with Hezbollah’s entry as a supplier of troops, has turned the tables in favor of Assad. The fighting can be brought to an end only by a political settlement imposed and guaranteed by the international community. Without it, the two sides will continue to fight indefinitely with the help of their out-side supporters. But a political settlement will take months or years to negotiate. In the meantime, Assad is following a deliberate policy of denying food and destroying the medical system as a way of subduing the civilian population. “Starve or surrender” is his motto.

This raises the specter of a human catastrophe. Unless humanitarian assistance can be delivered across battle lines, more people will have died from illness and starvation during the winter than from actual fighting.

Schmitz: What about Iran?

Soros: There has been an actual breakthrough in the Iranian crisis in the form of a temporary agreement on nuclear weapons with the new president Hassan Rouhani. The sanctions imposed by the Western powers have been very effective. The Iranian revolution itself advanced to the point where it fell into the hands of a narrow clique, the Revolutionary Guard; the mullahs were largely pushed out of power. As head of the mullahs, the Supreme Leader could not have been pleased. He must also be aware that the large majority of the population has been profoundly dissatisfied with the regime. In contrast with previous attempts at negotiations, he seems to be in favor of reaching an accommodation with the United States. That improves the prospects for a final agreement. We must take into account, as Vali Nasr recently wrote, that Iran has, after Russia, the world’s second-largest reserves of natural gas; and it potentially might compete with Russia in supplying gas to Europe.

Schmitz: That leaves the longest—lasting crisis, Palestine.

Soros: Recent developments in Egypt have improved the chances of progress in the long-festering Palestinian crisis. The army, with the active support of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, has removed the legally elected president and is engaged in the brutal suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood. This otherwise disturbing development has a potentially benign side effect: it raises the possibility of a peace settlement between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, to the exclusion of Hamas. This would have been inconceivable a few months ago. Secretary of State John Kerry became engaged in the Palestinian negotiations well before this window of opportunity opened, so he is ahead of the game. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is very suspicious but, for all his intransigence, cannot openly oppose negotiations because, having openly supported Mitt Romney in the American elections, he holds a relatively weak hand. Negotiations are making progress, but very slowly indeed.

If all three crises were resolved, a new order would emerge in the Middle East. There is a long way to go because the various conflicts are interconnected, and the potential losers in one conflict may act as spoilers in another. Netanyahu, for instance, is dead set against a deal with Iran because peace with Palestine would end his political career in Israel. Nevertheless, the broad outlines of a potential new order can already be discerned, although we cannot know the effects of the current crisis in Ukraine. Russia could become more influential, relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States may become strained, and Iran may emerge as America’s closest ally, second only to Israel. But the situation remains fluid and may change from one day to the next.

Schmitz: Recently the crisis in Ukraine has overshadowed all the others.

Soros: Indeed. Ukraine and in particular Crimea are of much greater interest to Russia than anything in the Middle East. Putin woefully misjudged the situation. Last autumn he had no difficulty in outmaneuvering the European Union, which was hamstrung by its internal political and financial problems. Under German leadership it offered too little and demanded too much. Putin could easily offer a better deal to Ukrainian President Yanukovych. But the Ukrainian people rebelled, upsetting the calculations of both sides.

The rebellion wounded Putin in his Achilles heel. The idea of a spontaneous rebellion simply did not enter into his calculations. In his view the world is ruled by power and those in power can easily manipulate public opinion. Failure to control the people is a sign of weakness.

Accordingly, he made it a condition of his assistance that Yanukovych should repress the rebellion. But the use of force aroused the public and eventually Yanukovych was forced to capitulate. This could have resulted in a stalemate and the preservation of the status quo with Ukraine precariously balanced between Russia and Europe, and a corrupt and inept government pitted against civil society. It would have been an inferior equilibrium with the costs exceeding the benefits for all parties concerned.

But Putin persisted in his counterproductive approach. Yanukovych was first hospitalized and then sent to Sochi to be dressed down by Putin. Putin’s instructions brought the confrontation to a climax. Contrary to all rational expectations, a group of citizens armed with not much more than sticks and shields made of cardboard boxes and metal garbage can lids overwhelmed a police force firing live ammunition. There were many casualties, but the citizens prevailed. It was a veritable miracle.

Schmitz: How could such a thing happen? How do you explain it?

Soros: It fits right into my human uncertainty principle, but it also reveals a remarkable similarity between human affairs and quantum physics of which I was previously unaware. According to Max Planck, among others, subatomic phenomena have a dual character: they can manifest themselves as particles or waves. Something similar applies to human beings: they are part freestanding individuals or particles and partly components of larger entities that behave like waves. The impact they make on reality depends on which alternative dominates their behavior. There are potential tipping points from one alternative to the other but it is uncertain when they will occur and the uncertainty can be resolved only in retrospect.

On February 20 a tipping point was reached when the people on Maidan Square were so determined to defend Ukraine that they forgot about their individual mortality. What gave their suicidal stand historic significance is that it succeeded. A deeply divided society was moved from the verge of civil war to an unprecedented unity. Revolutions usually fail. The Orange Revolution of 2004 deteriorated into a squabble between its leaders. It would be a mistake to conclude that this revolution is doomed to suffer the same fate. Indeed the parties participating in the interim government are determined to avoid it. In retrospect the resistance of Maidan may turn out to be the birth of a nation. This promising domestic development was a direct response to foreign oppression. Unfortunately it is liable to provoke further pressure from abroad because successful resistance by Ukraine would present an existential threat to Putin’s continued dominance in Russia.

Schmitz: You are referring to the Russian invasion of Crimea. How do you see it playing out?

Soros: If it is confined to Crimea it will serve as a further impetus to greater national cohesion in Ukraine. Crimea is not an integral part of Ukraine. Khrushchev transferred Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 by an administrative decree. The majority of its population is Russian and it is the base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. That is exactly why Putin is liable to put military and economic pressure on Ukraine directly and they are not in a position to resist it on their own. They need the support of the Western powers. So Ukraine’s future depends on how the Western powers, particularly Germany, respond.

Schmitz: What should the Western powers do?

Soros: They should focus on strengthening Ukraine rather than on punishing Russia. They cannot prevent or reverse the annexation of Crimea. They are bound to protest it of course because it violates the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 that guaranteed the territorial integrity of Ukraine, including Crimea, but they are not in a position to oppose it by military means. Even sanctions ought to be used sparingly in order to preserve them as a deterrent against the real danger, namely of direct military or economic assault on Ukraine. Russian forces have already occupied a gas plant in Ukraine supplying Crimea and may take more territory unless they are stopped.

Fortunately economic sanctions would be a potent deterrent provided they are used judiciously. Freezing the foreign assets of Russian oligarchs is the opposite of smart sanctions. Oligarchs sending their profits and their children abroad weaken the Russian economy. Until now capital flight was more or less offset by foreign direct investment. Effective sanctions would discourage the inflow of funds, whether in the form of direct investments or bank loans. Moreover, the US could release oil from its strategic reserve and allow its sale abroad. That could put the Russian economy into deficit. The Russian economy is fragile enough to be vulnerable to smart sanctions.

Schmitz: Wouldn’t that be cutting off your nose to spite your face? Germany has a lot of investments in Russia, which are equally vulnerable.

Soros: Effective sanctions against Russia should be threatened at first only as a deterrent. If the threat is effective, they wouldn’t be applied. But Chancellor Merkel faces a fundamental choice: should Germany be guided by its narrow national self interests or should it assert its leadership position within the European Union and forge a unified European response? On her choice hinges not only the fate of Ukraine but also the future of the European Union. Her passionate speech to the German Parliament on March 13 gives me hope that she is going to make the right choice.

Schmitz: What is your idea of the right choice?

Soros: A large-scale technical and financial assistance program for Ukraine. The EU and the US, under the leadership of the International Monetary Fund, are putting together a multibillion-dollar rescue package that will save the country from financial collapse. But that is not enough: Ukraine also needs outside assistance that only the EU can provide: management expertise and access to markets.

Ukraine is a potentially attractive investment destination. But realizing this potential requires improving the business climate by addressing the endemic corruption and weak rule of law. The new regime in Ukraine is eager to confront that task. But only the EU can open up its domestic market and provide political risk insurance for investing in Ukraine. Ukraine in turn would encourage its companies to improve their management by finding European partners. Thus Ukraine would become increasingly integrated in the European common market. That could also provide a much-needed fiscal stimulus for the European economy and, even more importantly, help to recapture the spirit that originally inspired the European Union.

http://english.pravda.ru/world/europe/14-06-2009/107768-gorbachev-0/
"It is hard to say whether the Soviet leaders could envisage such a situation at the moment when Mr. Gorbachev was signing the document on June 12, 1989. The document helped NATO reach Russia’s borders absolutely legally within a very short period of time. "

Europe's 5 deadly sins http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=54743 

The unfolding political catastrophe in Ukraine has led not only to a vivid debate about appropriate crisis management but also to deep European soul-searching about the root causes of the disaster.

The situation is complex, and no one actor deserves all the blame. But it is now clear that the EU made almost every strategic mistake possible in its handling of the Ukraine file. Europe’s leaders should examine those mistakes carefully to avoid making them again in the future.

Initially, the EU’s Eastern Partnership appeared to be moving in the right direction. Until late 2013, the EU had an interesting offer for Ukraine: a series of association and free-trade agreements that would grant the country access to Western money and markets.

The EU institutions made the project a priority and created an impression of political unity around it. Even the European Neighborhood Policy’s conceptual flaws, analyzed lucidly in a recent paper by Carnegie Europe’s Stefan Lehne, did not derail the undertaking. Everyone expected the Ukrainian government to sign the EU accords at a summit in Vilnius in November 2013.

But then everything fell apart.

In their first mistake, Europeans completely misread their interlocutors’ motivations and interests. The EU failed to see that then president Viktor Yanukovych was not interested in developing Ukraine’s economy and modernizing its politics and society. All he was concerned about was his political survival. The EU’s tools, with their assumption that Ukraine would be willing to reform, were bound to be useless.

Even more disastrous was the EU’s misreading of Russia. In recent years, Russian President Vladimir Putin has talked about the Kremlin’s fears of Western encirclement. He has declared that EU and NATO enlargement are part of a conspiracy to destroy Russia, that Ukraine is not really a sovereign nation, and that Western agents provocateurs were behind Ukraine’s 2004–2005 Orange Revolution.

Amid all that rhetoric, the West failed to recognize that Putin was deadly serious. Such talk was dismissed either as cheap propaganda or as the mild lunacy of a handful of overideologized true believers. Nobody imagined that Putin himself really believed his own bluster.

But for the Russian president, the fight over Ukraine is not an imperialistic adventure, it is a fight for survival against a mortal Western enemy. Just because observers in the West know that’s nonsense, that doesn’t mean that others think the same. Such Western projections were finally debunked when German Chancellor Angela Merkel remarked to U.S. President Barack Obama on March 2 that Putin was “in another world.”

Putin is indeed acting within an alternative reality. That the West failed to grasp this, despite enormous diplomatic efforts and an array of forums, summits, and consultations, was probably its biggest strategic mistake.

As a consequence, the EU made its second error: it realized too late that it was in the middle of a geopolitical game. The EU brought a low-politics toolbox to a high-politics construction site. It believed, almost until the day of Yanukovych’s ouster, that the Ukraine dossier was merely a technical one that could be dealt with by experienced bureaucrats instead of senior politicians. That was never going to work.

Equally important was mistake number three, the EU’s failure to coordinate its approach in Europe’s East with the United States. To be fair, Washington was not particularly interested in yet another boring technical EU project, and it also woke up rather late to the geopolitical eminence of the Ukraine crisis.

But in its dealings with what Russia considers its own legitimate sphere of influence, the EU should never take any major steps without its most important ally firmly aligned. That might hurt the pride of some Europeans, but that kind of pride has never been a particularly helpful adviser. The Ukraine disaster must also be considered a momentous failure of the transatlantic relationship.

Blunder number four was the EU’s inability to commit itself to the Eastern neighborhood with full force. Despite a show of political unity before the Vilnius summit, most EU member states did not have their whole heart in the matter.

Germany came on board as a supporter of the EU’s Eastern Partnership, but had to be lured into doing so. The UK had lost all interest in EU foreign policy long ago and was afraid of a worsening of already strained relations with Moscow. Southern countries were reluctant as they feared a shift of focus away from the EU’s Southern neighborhood. Other members were too absorbed with domestic affairs and economic woes, or were just too small to be bothered.

And so a cornerstone of the EU’s external relations was never infused with enough political energy from the member states, the only real source of power in the EU system.

Finally, the EU’s fifth strategic shortcoming was to underestimate the attractiveness of its own model to millions of Ukrainians. So used to crisis talk, self-bashing, and Euroskepticism at home, Europeans could barely believe it when protesters in Kiev wrapped themselves in EU flags. Demonstrators were not only standing up to corruption and mismanagement but were also demanding a right to pursue their liberal, European dream.

It is certainly useful to be self-critical. But for the EU to be ignorant about its own core strengths and soft power was a grave strategic mistake.

None of these considerations will help the EU much in the immediate crisis management of the Crimean crisis and the standoff with Russia. But eventually, room for strategy will return to Europe’s Eastern neighborhood. The EU would do well to take a careful look at its own strategic mistakes to avoid repeating them when that moment comes.

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ENTREPRENEURIAL REVOLUTION NETWORK BENCHMARKS 2025now : Remembering Norman Macrae

unaiwho.docx version 6/6/22 hunt for 100 helping guterres most with UN2.0

EconomistDiary.com Friends20.com & EntrepreneurialRevolution.city select 2022's greatest moments for citizens/youth of NY & HK & Utellus

Prep for UN Sept 22 summit education no longer fit for human beings/sustainability

JOIN SEARCH FOR UNDER 30s MOST MASSIVE COLLABS FOR HUMAN SUSTAINABILITY - 3/21/22 HAPPY 50th Birthday TO WORLD'S MOST SUSTAINABLE ECONOMY- ASIAN WOMEN SUPERVILLAGE

Since gaining my MA statistics Cambridge DAMTP 1973 (Corpus Christi College) my special sibject has been community building networks- these are the 6 most exciting collaboration opportunities my life has been privileged to map - the first two evolved as grassroots person to person networks before 1996 in tropical Asian places where village women had no access to electricity grids nor phones- then came mobile and solar entrepreneurial revolutions!! 

COLLAB platforms of livesmatter communities to mediate public and private -poorest village mothers empowering end of poverty    5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5  5.6


4 livelihood edu for all 

4.1  4.2  4.3  4.4  4.5 4.6


3 last mile health services  3.1 3,2  3.3  3.4   3.5   3.6


last mile nutrition  2.1   2.2   2.3   2.4  2.5  2,6


banking for all workers  1.1  1.2  1.3   1.4   1.5   1.6


NEWS FROM LIBRARY NORMAN MACRAE -latest publication 2021 translation into japanese biography of von neumann:

Below: neat German catalogue (about half of dad's signed works) but expensive  -interesting to see how Germans selected the parts  they like over time: eg omitted 1962 Consider Japan The Economist 

feel free to ask if free versions are available 

The coming entrepreneurial revolution : a survey Macrae, Norman - In: The economist 261 (1976), pp. 41-65 cited 105 

Macrae, Norman - In: IPA review / Institute of PublicAffairs 25 (1971) 3, pp. 67-72  
 Macrae, Norman - The Economist 257 (1975), pp. 1-44 
6 The future of international business Macrae, Norman - In: Transnational corporations and world order : readings …, (pp. 373-385). 1979 >
Future U.S. growth and leadership assessed from abroad Macrae, Norman - In: Prospects for growth : changing expectations for the future, (pp. 127-140). 1977 Check Google Scholar | 
9Entrepreneurial Revolution - next capitalism: in hi-tech left=right=center; The Economist 1976
Macrae, Norman -In: European community (1978), pp. 3-6
  Macrae, Norman - In: Kapitalismus heute, (pp. 191-204). 1974
23a 

. we scots are less than 4/1000 of the worlds and 3/4 are Diaspora - immigrants in others countries. Since 2008 I have been celebrating Bangladesh Women Empowerment solutions wth NY graduates. Now I want to host love each others events in new york starting this week with hong kong-contact me if we can celebrate anoither countries winm-wins with new yorkers

mapping OTHER ECONOMIES:

50 SMALLEST ISLAND NATIONS

TWO Macroeconomies FROM SIXTH OF PEOPLE WHO ARE WHITE & war-prone

ADemocratic

Russian

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From 60%+ people =Asian Supercity (60TH YEAR OF ECONOMIST REPORTING - SEE CONSIDER JAPAN1962)

Far South - eg African, Latin Am, Australasia

Earth's other economies : Arctic, Antarctic, Dessert, Rainforest

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In addition to how the 5 primary sdgs1-5 are gravitated we see 6 transformation factors as most critical to sustainability of 2020-2025-2030

Xfactors to 2030 Xclimate XAI Xinfra Xyouth Wwomen Xpoor chris.macrae@yahoo.co.uk (scot currently  in washington DC)- in 1984 i co-authored 2025 report with dad norman.

Asia Rising Surveys

Entrepreneurial Revolution -would endgame of one 40-year generations of applying Industrial Revolution 3,4 lead to sustainability of extinction

1972's Next 40 Years ;1976's Coming Entrepreneurial Revolution; 12 week leaders debate 1982's We're All Intrapreneurial Now

The Economist had been founded   in 1843" marking one of 6 exponential timeframes "Future Histores"

IN ASSOCIATION WITH ADAMSMITH.app :

we offer worldwide mapping view points from

1 2 now to 2025-30

and these viewpoints:

40 years ago -early 1980s when we first framed 2025 report;

from 1960s when 100 times more tech per decade was due to compound industrial revolutions 3,4 

1945 birth of UN

1843 when the economist was founded

1760s - adam smithian 2 views : last of pre-engineering era; first 16 years of engineering ra including america's declaration of independence- in essence this meant that to 1914 continental scaling of engineeriing would be separate new world <.old world

conomistwomen.com

IF we 8 billion earthlings of the 2020s are to celebrate collaboration escapes from extinction, the knowhow of the billion asian poorest women networks will be invaluable -

in mathematically connected ways so will the stories of diaspora scots and the greatest mathematicians ever home schooled -central european jewish teens who emigrated eg Neumann , Einstein ... to USA 2nd quarter of the 20th century; it is on such diversity that entrepreneurial revolution diaries have been shaped 

EconomistPOOR.com : Dad was born in the USSR in 1923 - his dad served in British Embassies. Dad's curiosity enjoyed the opposite of a standard examined education. From 11+ Norman observed results of domination of humans by mad white men - Stalin from being in British Embassy in Moscow to 1936; Hitler in Embassy of last Adriatic port used by Jews to escape Hitler. Then dad spent his last days as a teen in allied bomber command navigating airplanes stationed at modernday Myanmar. Surviving thanks to the Americas dad was in Keynes last class where he was taught that only a handful of system designers control what futures are possible. EconomistScotland.com AbedMooc.com

To help mediate such, question every world eventwith optimistic rationalism, my father's 2000 articles at The Economist interpret all sorts of future spins. After his 15th year he was permitted one signed survey a year. In the mid 1950s he had met John Von Neumann whom he become biographer to , and was the only journalist at Messina's's birth of EU. == If you only have time for one download this one page tour of COLLABorations composed by Fazle Abed and networked by billion poorest village women offers clues to sustainability from the ground up like no white ruler has ever felt or morally audited. by London Scot James Wilson. Could Queen Victoria change empire fro slavemaking to commonwealth? Some say Victoria liked the challenge James set her, others that she gave him a poison pill assignment. Thus James arrived in Calcutta 1860 with the Queens permission to charter a bank by and for Indian people. Within 9 months he died of diarrhea. 75 years later Calcutta was where the Young Fazle Abed grew up - his family accounted for some of the biggest traders. Only to be partitioned back at age 11 to his family's home region in the far north east of what had been British Raj India but was now to be ruled by Pakistan for 25 years. Age 18 Abed made the trek to Glasgow University to study naval engineering.

new york

1943 marked centenary autobio of The Economist and my teenage dad Norman prepping to be navigator allied bomber command Burma Campaign -thanks to US dad survived, finished in last class of Keynes. before starting 5 decades at The Economist; after 15 years he was allowed to sign one survey a year starting in 1962 with the scoop that Japan (Korea S, Taiwan soon hk singapore) had found development mp0de;s for all Asian to rise. Rural Keynes could end village poverty & starvation; supercity win-win trades could celebrate Neumanns gift of 100 times more tech per decade (see macrae bio of von neumann)

Since 1960 the legacy of von neumann means ever decade multiplies 100 times more micro-technology- an unprecedented time for better or worse of all earthdwellers; 2025 timelined and mapped innovation exponentials - education, health, go green etc - (opportunities threats) to celebrating sustainability generation by 2025; dad parted from earth 2010; since then 2 journals by adam smith scholars out of Glasgow where engines began in 1760- Social Business; New Economics have invited academic worlds and young graduates to question where the human race is going - after 30 business trips to wealthier parts of Asia, through 2010s I have mainly sherpa's young journalist to Bangladesh - we are filing 50 years of cases on women empowerment at these web sites AbedMOOC.com FazleAbed.com EconomistPoor.com EconomistUN.com WorldRecordjobs.com Economistwomen.com Economistyouth.com EconomistDiary.com UNsummitfuture.com - in my view how a billion asian women linked together to end extreme poverty across continental asia is the greatest and happiest miracle anyone can take notes on - please note the rest of this column does not reflect my current maps of how or where the younger half of the world need to linkin to be the first sdg generation......its more like an old scrap book

 how do humans design futures?-in the 2020s decade of the sdgs – this question has never had more urgency. to be or not to be/ – ref to lessons of deming or keynes, or glasgow university alumni smith and 200 years of hi-trust economics mapmaking later fazle abed - we now know how-a man made system is defined by one goal uniting generations- a system multiplies connected peoples work and demands either accelerating progress to its goal or collapsing - sir fazle abed died dec 2020 - so who are his most active scholars climate adaptability where cop26 november will be a great chance to renuite with 260 years of adam smith and james watts purposes t end poverty-specifically we interpret sdg 1 as meaning next girl or boy born has fair chance at free happy an productive life as we seek to make any community a child is born into a thriving space to grow up between discover of new worlds in 1500 and 1945 systems got worse and worse on the goal eg processes like slavery emerged- and ultimately the world was designed around a handful of big empires and often only the most powerful men in those empires. 4 amazing human-tech systems were invented to start massive use by 1960 borlaug agriculture and related solutions every poorest village (2/3people still had no access to electricity) could action learn person to person- deming engineering whose goal was zero defects by helping workers humanize machines- this could even allowed thousands of small suppliers to be best at one part in machines assembled from all those parts) – although americans invented these solution asia most needed them and joyfully became world class at them- up to 2 billion people were helped to end poverty through sharing this knowhow- unlike consuming up things actionable knowhow multiplies value in use when it links through every community that needs it the other two technologies space and media and satellite telecoms, and digital analytic power looked promising- by 1965 alumni of moore promised to multiply 100 fold efficiency of these core tech each decade to 2030- that would be a trillion tmes moore than was needed to land on the moon in 1960s. you might think this tech could improve race to end poverty- and initially it did but by 1990 it was designed around the long term goal of making 10 men richer than 40% poorest- these men also got involved in complex vested interests so that the vast majority of politicians in brussels and dc backed the big get bigger - often they used fake media to hide what they were doing to climate and other stuff that a world trebling in population size d\ - we the 3 generations children parents grandparents have until 2030 to design new system orbits gravitated around goal 1 and navigating the un's other 17 goals do you want to help/ 8 cities we spend most time helping students exchange sustainability solutions 2018-2019 BR0 Beijing Hangzhou: 

Girls world maps begin at B01 good news reporting with fazleabed.com  valuetrue.com and womenuni.com

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online library of norman macrae--

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MA1 AliBaba TaoBao

Ma 2 Ali Financial

Ma10.1 DT and ODPS

health catalogue; energy catalogue

Keynes: 2025now - jobs Creating Gen

.

how poorest women in world build

A01 BRAC health system,

A02 BRAC education system,

A03 BRAC banking system

K01 Twin Health System - Haiti& Boston

Past events EconomistDiary.com

include 15th annual spring collaboration cafe new york - 2022 was withsister city hong kong designers of metaverse for beeings.app

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